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ABSTRACT
We use text-based computational analysis of business descriptions from 10-Ks to examine in which
industries conglomerates are most likely to operate and to understand conglomerate valuations. We
find that conglomerates are more likely to operate in industry pairs that are closer together in the product
space and in industry pairs that have profitable opportunities "between" them. Conglomerate firms
have lower stock market valuations than matched single-segment firms when their products are easier
to replicate with single-segment firms. Conglomerate firms have stock market premiums when they
have higher product differentiation and produce in more profitable industries. These findings are consistent
with successful conglomerate firms having higher product differentiation and lower cost entry into
profitable markets when operating in strategically chosen industry pairs.
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rms operate in multiple industries? This question has been the focus
of much research that takes the industries that rms operate in as given, and exam-
ines outcomes such as valuations and investment decisions. Existing explanations for
multiple industry production based on investment decisions include advantages of in-
ternal capital markets (Stein (1997)), agency problems (Lang and Stulz (1994) Berger
and Ofek (1995), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), Scharfstein and Stein (2000)), con-
glomerate learning about ability (Matsusaka (2001)) and managerial talent that can
be used in dierent industries (Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)). This literature does
not examine why conglomerate rms span some industries and not others.
We take a dierent approach in this study. We use fundamental product mar-
ket characteristics to analyze in which industries conglomerate rms produce. We
examine whether conglomerate rms may create value through operating in related
industries that allow for synergies, new products to be created and potential entry
into new markets. The idea we examine is simple and is related to that of Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson (2008) who examine the importance of asset complementarities
in mergers. While Robinson and Rhodes-Kropf examine rm complementarities,
we examine potential industry complementarities. We ask whether certain industry
characteristics - distinct from vertical relatedness - make operating in two dierent
industries valuable? Are industries related in certain ways that make it likely that
rms will nd it optimal to produce in multiple industries? Apple Computer is an
example of a rm that now produces in cell phones, computers, and digital music -
industries that are today very related to each other. It faces some rms that oper-
ate individually in each of these industries but more rms today are attempting to
operate in these related industries.
We use text-based analysis of conglomerate and pure play business descriptions
from 10-Ks led with the SEC to examine in which industries conglomerates are most
likely to operate and to explore conglomerate valuations in cross-section. Following
Hoberg and Phillips (2010a), we convert rm product text into a spatial represen-
tation of the product market. In this framework, each rm, and each industry, has
a product location based on words that allow measurement of how close product
markets are to each other. Our framework also allows an assessment of which in-
1dustries in the product market space are \between" any given pair of industries,
where \between" industries are industries that are closer to each industry of a given
industry pair than the industry pair is to each other. We control for other measures
of relatedness including vertical integration in assessing the impact of our text-based
measures of relatedness.
We nd that conglomerate pairs are more likely to operate in industry pairs
that are closer together in the product space, industry pairs that have protable
opportunities between them, and in industries with lower within-industry product
similarity. Conglomerate rms are also less likely to produce in industries that span
other competitive, low-value industries. These ndings are consistent with product
synergies, where conglomerates producing in two related protable industries may
be able to enter protable industries that are between them.
We use text-based analysis to assess conglomerate valuation. Our primary contri-
bution is to redene the universe of competitor single-segment rms used to construct
conglomerate valuation benchmarks, and then to use best-t vocabulary matching
of 10-K business descriptions of single-segment rms to conglomerate rms assigning
dierential weights to each single-segment rm. We also consider enhanced bench-
marks that additionally seek to match the conglomerate to single-segment rms along
ve key accounting dimensions including protability and growth. We present strong
evidence that our weighted benchmarks provide economically large improvements in
the accuracy of conglomerate reconstructions.
Once we have these best matches, we then seek to explain dierences between
the valuation of the matched rms and the actual conglomerate valuation. Our pri-
mary focus is then on understanding cross-sectional variation in conglomerate excess
valuations - not in assessing the average discount or premium of conglomerate rms.
1 We nd that, on average, conglomerates do not trade at a discount relative to
1For articles on average or median discount of conglomerate rms see Wernerfelt and Mont-
gomery (1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995),
Servaes (1996), Lins and Servaes (1999), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and Lamont and Polk
(2002) nd evidence of a diversication discount. Laeven and Levine (2007) nd discount in nan-
cial conglomerates. However this average discount has been shown to be driven by self-selection
by Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), and Villalonga (2004b) and by
data problems by Villalonga (2004a) and merger accounting by Custodio (2010). See Maksimovic
and Phillips (2007) for a detailed survey.
2text-matched single segment rms. However, this average eect masks important
cross-sectional variation. We nd that conglomerates that are more dicult to re-
construct using pure plays tend to trade at modest premia and those conglomerates
that are most easy to replicate trade at discounts. We also nd that conglomerate
valuation is higher when conglomerates span high-value industries. These ndings
are consistent with conglomerate rms producing in related industries that have
product synergies when these segments are combined, and in industries that are
more dicult to enter for competing single-segment rms.
The main contributions of our paper are two-fold. Our rst main contribution is
to use word similarity from rm product descriptions to understand in which indus-
tries conglomerate rms choose to produce. We calculate several unique relatedness
measures across and within industries. We calculate within industry similarity to
measure how dierent rms are within SIC classications and to capture potential
product dierentiation. We also calculate pairwise industry relatedness to measure
the similarity of industries to each other. The nal measure we calculate is the num-
ber of industries \between" two industries, where an industry is between two others
if it is closer in similarity to each of the two industries individually than they are to
each other. This last measure captures potential competition between two industry
segments and also the potential for multiple industry rms to introduce new products
at low cost in those product spaces between their operating segments.
Our second main contribution is to further explain cross-sectional conglomerate
valuation. We use text-based analysis to form a more accurate matched set of pure-
play competitors such that each rm and each segment has its own allocated set
of competitors. This new \network" method of competition draws on a rm- and
segment-centric notion of competition analogous to a Facebook circle of friends. In
order to nd competitor rms, we use the text similarity of rms to each reported
segment of the conglomerate rm and then weight these rms by how similar they
are to the overall multiple industry rm. We weight these rms dierentially so that
similar rms receive a higher weight based on text-based distances. Both the set of
weights and overall goodness of t of the pure-play competitors in matching the con-
glomerate rm provide information about the competitive structure a conglomerate
3faces in its respective segments.
Our measure of how dicult a conglomerate is to replicate using pure play rms
(which is derived based on the R2 from the vocabulary decomposition) is a more
accurate measure of the conglomerate's overall competitive position. Firms that
cannot be easily replicated are highly dierentiated, and likely face less competition
for their overall product oerings. We nd that conglomerate rms that are more
dicult to replicate and that span high-value industries are more valuable than
conglomerates that are easier to replicate and span low-value industries.
We add to the existing literature in two central ways. First, we examine which
industries conglomerates are more likely to operate within and we are the rst to
explore the link between conglomerate structure and the overall industry structure
surrounding the each conglomerate. Previous research has examined the investment
decisions of conglomerate rms including Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes, and
Zingales (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002).
Maksimovic and Phillips examine how long-run industry characteristics eect ac-
quisition decisions by conglomerate and single-segment rms. Hann, Ogneva, and
Ozbas (2011) show that producing in dierent industries lowers a rm's cost of cap-
ital consistent with a coinsurance eect. We examine which industry factors explain
the distribution of conglomerate industry segments.
Second, with respect to conglomerate valuation, many authors have examined
whether diversied rms trade at an average discount relative to single-segment com-
petitors. While we do show that the average discount disappears by nding better
matched pure play rms, this is not our main contribution. Our main contribution
relative to this literature is to show that, cross-sectionally, the discount varies with
industry characteristics, especially the ability to easily replicate a conglomerate using
pure plays.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss our new measures of
industry relatedness and spanning and how our paper provides tests of the potential
for product market synergies by focusing on within and cross-industry similarity. In
Section 2, we present our methodology and how we calculate our new text based
4measures of within and cross-industry similarity. Section 3 contains the results of
our tests of how industry relatedness and spanning aect conglomerate production.
Section 4 analyzes cross-sectional conglomerate valuation and Section 5 concludes.
I Industry Relatedness and Spanning
We ask whether there are certain industry characteristics - distinct from vertical
relatedness - that make operating in two dierent industries valuable. The central
hypothesis we examine is whether the potential for product market synergies and
industry competition inuence in which industries conglomerate rms produce. Our
foundation is similar to that of Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) and Hoberg and
Phillips (2010b) who examine whether asset complementarities and synergies are
important for mergers. Going beyond the previous analysis, we also consider the
role of opportunities and competition in surrounding and between industries.
We consider whether the industries a given industry pair "spans" inuences
whether conglomerate rms produce within that industry pair. Industry spanning is
the idea that there may be a product space or industry that is more similar to each
industry in a given industry pair than the two industries in the pair are similar to
each other. In a spatial sense, such an industry lies between the two industries in the
pair. We hypothesize that a conglomerate is more likely to produce in a particular
industry pair if that pair spans other highly valued, less competitive industries. Pro-
ducing in such an industry pair may allow the multiple industry rm to more easily
enter and produce products in these highly-valued concentrated product markets.
We generate industry pair characteristics using text-based analysis of business
descriptions from 10-Ks led with the SEC. We then examine these industry charac-
teristics to understand in which industries conglomerates are most likely to operate
and to understand cross-sectional conglomerate valuation. We discuss the way we
gather and process these 10-K product descriptions in the next section. In this
section we introduce conceptually the variables we use to capture how industries
are related to each other. We consider these new measures in addition to existing
industry-relatedness measures including vertical integration.
5We construct three new variables that allow us to assess how every pair of in-
dustries relates to one another. In particular, we measure how far apart industries
are in the product space, how heterogeneous their products are within-industry, and
the extent to which other industries lie between the given industry pair in the prod-
uct space. To construct industry relatedness measures, we begin by using the the
relatedness of each pairwise set of rms that operate either within an industry or
across any given industry pair. These product relatedness measures are constructed
for each pair of rms using the words from each rm's business description from
their 10K led with the SEC. We discuss the specic word relatedness measures we
use - the cosine similarity measure - later in the subsequent data and methodology
section.
One crucial part of our analysis is to identify industry membership. Given that we
will be comparing our text-based measures with existing methods, we begin by using
the existing Compustat segment-level industry designations to identify which rms
are conglomerates and to assess conglomerate industry congurations. To construct
industry attributes, we focus on single-segment rms and omit the words from the
product descriptions from the conglomerate rms themselves, to avoid producing a
mechanistic relation. We then use the Compustat segment denitions to examine how
the observed conglomerate industry congurations relate to these text-based industry
attributes from single-segment rms. Because conglomerate segments are reported
using SIC codes, our initial analysis relates to industry congurations and their
incidence is based on three-digit SIC code industry denitions. In later analysis, we
relax this initial reliance on SIC-3 industry denitions when exploring conglomerate
valuations and benchmark reconstructions.2
The rst industry relatedness variable we calculate is Across Industry Similarity
(AIS). This measures how close industry i and industry j are in the product space.
Suppose industry i has Ni pure play rms, and industry j has Nj pure play rms.
Across industry similarity is the average textual cosine similarity of all pairwise
2Due to the high dimensionality of the calculations underlying the initial industry spanning
tests, we do not consider alternative industry denitions for this part of our analysis as doing so
would render our calculations infeasible due to the exponential growth in the number of industry
pairwise permutations.
6permutations of the Ni and Nj rms, where textual similarity is based on word
vectors from rm business descriptions (see Section II.C for a discussion of the cosine
similarity method). Simply put, it captures the proportion of product words the two
rms in a pair have in common. Each pair in a permutation includes one rm from
industry i and one from industry j and we average the cosine similarity measures
across all such pairs from the two industries. The AIS measure is meant to capture the
similarities between products that two industries produce. Industries that are closer
together share similar sets of words in their constituent rm product descriptions
and are potentially likely to share asset complementarities.
Second, we measure Within Industry Similarity (WIS). Suppose industry i has
Ni pure play rms. Within industry similarity is the average cosine similarity of
the business descriptions for all pairwise permutations of these Ni rms. Firms
in industries with higher within industry similarity are likely to have less unique
products, and likely face more signicant competition from their rivals due to the
absence of product dierentiation. When assessing this measure for a given industry
pair, we compute WIS as the average within industry similarity of the two industries
i and j.
Third, we also measure the fraction of other industries between a pair of industries
i and j, which we label Between Industries. Because our text based measures give all
rms, and hence all industries, a unique location on a high dimensional unit sphere,
we can use geometry to assess whether other industries lie in the space between a
given industry pair. This novel measure can be used to examine whether conglom-
erates benet from business opportunities lying between their segments, perhaps
through asset complementarities. The AIS measure discussed above is instrumental
in computing the fraction of industries between a given pair. Where AISi;j denotes
the Across Industry Similarity of industries i and j, we dene a third industry k as
being between industries i and j if the following relationship holds.
AISk;i  AISi;j AND AISk;j  AISi;j (1)
The fraction of industries between a given pair of industries i and j is therefore the
number of industries k (excluding i and j) satisfying this condition divided by the
7total number of industries in the database in the given year (excluding i and j). We
also consider a dummy variable identifying industry pairs that have zero industries
lying between them.
We use these measures to test the following three hypotheses:
H1: Cross-Industry Similarity: Conglomerate rms are more likely to produce in
two industries that have high cross-industry similarity. These rms are likely easier
to manage and have more potential synergies.
We test this hypothesis by examining the number of conglomerate rms that
operate in each pairwise set of industries and examine whether this number of con-
glomerate rms is increasing in the pair's across industry similarity (AIS).
H2: Within-Industry Similarity: Conglomerate rms are less likely to produce
in industries that have high within industry similarity, or industries with high com-
petition.
We test this hypothesis by examining whether the number of conglomerate rms
operating in a pair is decreasing when the industry pair has a high within industry
similarity (WIS).
H3: Between-Industry Spanning: Conglomerate rms are more likely to operate
in an industry pair when the pair of industries spans more high-value, less competitive
industries.
We examine the fraction of industries that are between each pairwise combination
of industries and test whether conglomerate rms producing in a particular pairwise
combination increase when the industries spanned or between these industries are
highly valued and less competitive.
H4: Conglomerate Valuations and Spanning: Conglomerate valuation will in-
crease the harder the conglomerate rm is to replicate with pure-play single-segment
rms. Conglomerate valuation will increase relative to benchmark valuation if it
spans industries that are highly valued.
8II Data and Methodology
In this section we describe our conglomerate database, the construction of key text-
based variables used to examine where conglomerates produce in the product space,
and our identication of pure-play, single-segment conglomerate competitors.
A The COMPUSTAT Industry Sample
We construct our COMPUSTAT sample using the industrial annual les to identify
the universe of publicly traded rms, and the COMPUSTAT segment les to identify
which rms are conglomerates, and the industry of each segment. We dene a
conglomerate as a rm having operations in more than one SIC-3 industry in a given
year. To identify segments operating under a conglomerate structure, we start with
the segment les, which we clean to ensure we are identifying product-based segments
instead of geographic segments. We keep conglomerate segments that are identied
as business segments or operating segments. We only keep segments which report
positive sales. We aggregate segment information into 3 digit SIC codes and only
identify rms as conglomerate rms when they report two or more three digit SIC
codes. We identify 22,252 unique conglomerate rm years from 1996 to 2008 (we limit
our sample to these years due to required coverage of text-based variables), which
have 62,058 unique conglomerate-segment-years. We also identify 56,491 unique pure
play rm-years (rms with a single segment structure).
When we examine how conglomerates change from year to year, we further re-
quire that a conglomerate exist in the previous year. This requirement reduces our
sample to 18,589 unique conglomerate years having 53,126 segment-years. Because
we use pure play rms to assess industry characteristics that might be relevant to
the formation of conglomerates, we also discard conglomerate observations if they
have at least one segment operating in an industry for which there are no pure play
benchmarks in our sample. We are left with 15,373 unique conglomerate rm-years
with 40,769 unique segment conglomerate rm-years. This nal sample covers 2,552
unique three digit SIC industry-years. As there are 13 years in our sample, this is
roughly 196 industries per year.
9We also consider a separate database of pairwise permutations of the SIC-3
industries in each year. We use this database to assess which industry pairs are
most likely to be populated by conglomerates that span the given pair of industries.
This industry-pair-year database has 312,240 total industry pair x year observations
(roughly 24,018 industry pair permutations per year).
B The Sample of 10-Ks
The methodology we use to extract 10-K text follows Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) and
Hoberg and Phillips (2010b). The rst step is to use web crawling and text parsing
algorithms to construct a database of business descriptions from 10-K annual lings
on the SEC Edgar website from 1996 to 2008. We search the Edgar database for
lings that appear as \10-K," \10-K405," \10-KSB," or \10-KSB40." The business
descriptions appear as Item 1 or Item 1A in most 10-Ks. The document is then
processed using APL for text information and a company identier, CIK.3 Business
descriptions are legally required to be accurate, as Item 101 of Regulation S-K re-
quires rms to describe the signicant products they oer, and these descriptions
must be updated and representative of the current scal year of the 10-K.
C Word Vectors and Cosine Similarity
We employ methods used in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) and Hoberg and Phillips
(2010b) to construct word vectors and measure similarity. The rst step is to form
word vectors for each rm based on the text in product descriptions of each rm.
To construct each rm's word vector, we rst omit common words that are used
by more than 5% of all rms. We then consider the universe of all product words in
the 10-K universe in each year. Let Mt denote the number of such words. For a rm
i in year t, we dene its word vector Wi;t as a binary Mt-vector, having the value
one for a given element when rm i uses the given word in its year t 10-K business
description. We then normalize each rm's word vector to unit length, resulting in
3We thank the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) for providing us with an expanded
historical mapping of SEC CIK to COMPUSTAT gvkey, as the base CIK variable in COMPUSTAT
only contains the most recent link.
10the normalized word vector Ni;t.
Importantly, each rm is represented by a unique vector of length one in an Mt-
dimensional space. Therefore, all rms reside on a Mt-dimensional unit sphere, and
each rm has a known location. This spatial representation of the product space
allows us to construct variables that more richly measure industry topography, for
example, to identify other industries that lie between a given pair of industries.
The cosine similarity for any two word vectors Ni;t and Nj;t is their dot product
hNi;t Nj;ti. Cosine similarities are bounded in the interval [0,+1] when both vectors
are normalized to have unit length, and when they do not have negative elements,
as will be the case for the quantities we consider here. If two rms have similar
products, their dot product will tend towards 1.0 while dissimilarity moves the cosine
similarity toward zero. We use the \cosine similarity" method because it is widely
used in studies of information processing (see Sebastiani (2002) for a summary of
methods). It measures the angle between two word vectors on a unit sphere.
D Conglomerate Competitors
We use our text-based analysis of rms to redene and augment traditional iden-
tication of conglomerate competitors, which allows us to construct new measures
of excess conglomerate valuation. As a baseline calculation, we begin by following
the existing literature (Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995)) and we
consider existing pure-play single-segment rms as identied the Compustat segment
tapes as the set of competitors for each segment of a conglomerate. We refer to this
set of competitors as the Compustat set of rivals, and this set includes single-segment
rms with the same 3-digit SIC code as the reported Compustat segment. We then
consider several enhancements. First, rather than computing valuation ratios as
the simple median of all candidate single-segment rivals for a given conglomerate
segment, we weight each single segment rm using information from a vocabulary
decomposition of the conglomerate relative to the vocabulary used by all pure play
candidate rivals in their business descriptions. Firms with more words in common
with the conglomerate will thus have higher weights.
11Our second augmentation is to expand the set of \pure-play" single-segment
rivals by adding the single-segment rms that are in the conglomerate's VIC-7.06
industry as dened in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). These rms have a high product
word cosine similarity score relative to the conglomerate rm and are likely rivals.
Importantly, the VIC-7.06 industry classication is equally as coarse as are SIC-3
industries, so our results are not due to any changes in industry coarseness. The
number of potential competitor benchmarks for each conglomerate segment Nit;bench
is thus either as large (if no pure play VIC-7.06 peers exist) or larger (if pure play
VIC-7.06 peers do exist) than the Compustat set of rivals. We refer to this method
as the \SIC+VIC Universe" universe.
After identifying the potential competitors for each segment, we again weight
the potential rms based on the vocabulary decomposition to construct conglomer-
ate valuation benchmarks and excess valuation measures. We also consider further
enhancing the weighting scheme of the set of potential competitors so that pure
play benchmarks can match the conglomerate on accounting characteristics includ-
ing protability and sales growth. We discuss these valuation metrics and how we
use them to construct excess valuation measures for each conglomerate rm fully
in Section IV when we examine the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of
conglomerate valuation.
E Conglomerate Restructuring
We examine whether our spatial industry variables can explain how conglomerates
restructure over time, and we classify restructuring in four dierent ways. Because
we consider the role of industry topography, the unit of observation for these vari-
ables is a pair of segments operating within a conglomerate. We dene \Segment
Pair Disappears" as a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the
conglomerate's structure in the following year. We then dene \Segment Pair Likely
Sold or Closed" as a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the con-
glomerate's structure in the following year, and the conglomerate has fewer segments
in year t + 1 relative to year t. We dene \Segment Pair Likely Reclassied" as a
dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's structure
12in the following year, and the conglomerate has at least as many segments in year
t+1 relative to year t. Finally, we dene \Segment Pair Likely Sold O" as a dummy
equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's structure in the
following year, and the conglomerate was the target of an acquisition of at least ten
percent of its assets in year t + 1. We dene an analogous set of variables to assess
conglomerate segment pairs that newly appear in year t that were not part of the
conglomerate in year t   1.
F Control Variables and Vertical Integration
In addition to our three new industry similarity and relatedness variables, we include
control variables for industry size, vertical relatedness, and a dummy identifying
which industries are in the same two-digit SIC code. As we aim to examine conglom-
erate incidence rates across industry pairs, controlling for industry size is important.
For example, if conglomerates formed by randomly choosing among available pure
play rms in the economy, then the incidence of conglomerate spanning pairs would
be related to the product of the fraction of rms residing in industries i and j. There-
fore we dene the Pair Likelihood if Random variable as the product (FixFj), where
Fi is the number of pure play rms in industry i divided by the number of pure play
rms in the economy in the given year.
We consider the Input/Output tables to assess whether conglomerates tend to
span vertically related industry pairs. The inclusion of this control is motivated by
studies examining vertically related industries and corporate policy and structure
including Fan and Goyal (2006), Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2008), and Ahern and
Harford (2011). We consider the methodology described in Fan and Goyal (2006) to
identify vertically related industries. Based on three-digit SIC industries, we use the
\Use Table" of Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the US Economy to compute,
for each rm pairing, the fraction of inputs that ow between each pair.
Finally, we consider a dummy variable set equal to one if a given pair of three
digit SIC industries lies in the same two-digit SIC industry.
13G Summary Statistics
Table I displays summary statistics for our conglomerate and pure play rms, and
industry pair databases. Panel A shows that conglomerate rms are generally larger
than the pure play rms in terms of total value of the rm, and they also generally
operate in markets that are more concentrated, as measured by their VIC-7.06 HHI.
Panel B of the table compares randomly drawn pairs of SIC-3 industries to the
SIC-3 industries comprising a conglomerate conguration. The panel shows that a
randomly drawn pair of three digit SIC industries has 0.147 conglomerates having
segments operating in both industries of the given pair. Hence, the majority of
randomly chosen industries do not have conglomerates spanning them. The average
across industry similarity of random pairs is 0.017, which closely matches the average
rm similarity reported in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). This quantity is nearly
double for actual conglomerates at 0.032, indicating that conglomerates are far less
diversied than previously thought. This conclusion is reinforced by comparing the
fraction of all other industries lying between the given pair, which is 32.5% for random
pairs, and just 9.7% for actual conglomerates. Conglomerate industry pairs reside
in regions of the product space that are substantially closer together than randomly
chosen industries. The average within industry similarity, intuitively, is much higher
at 0.086. This quantity is somewhat lower at .073 for actual conglomerates.
[Insert Table I Here]
Table II displays the bivariate Pearson correlation coecients for our key indus-
try pair variables. The key variable we examine in the next section is the number of
spanning conglomerate pairs. The rst column of this table shows that this variable
is positively related to across industry similarity, and negatively related to within in-
dustry similarity and the fraction of industries between a given pair. Although these
univariate results hold for across industry similarity and within industry similarity,
multivariate results vary for the fraction of industries between variable (discussed
later). This is related to the relatively high observed pairwise correlation of -69.1%
between this variable and across industry similarity. Intuitively, industries that are
further away likely have more industries residing between them. Our later results
14will show that conglomerates are more likely to span industry pairs that have con-
centrated or high value industries residing in the product space between the given
pair, but not when competitive or low value industries do.
The table also shows that the average HHI variable and the within industry
similarity variable are modestly correlated at -48.7%. This result is consistent with
ndings in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a), and conrms that concentrated product
markets generally have more product dierentiation. Aside from these modest to high
correlations, Table II shows that the other variables we consider have relatively low
correlations. This fact, along with our very large database of 312,240 observations,
indicates that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern in our analysis.
[Insert Table II Here]
Table III displays the mean values of our three key text variables for various
conglomerate industry pairings. One observation is an industry pair permutation of
an actual conglomerate. In Panel A, we nd that conglomerates populate industries
with across industry similarity of .0304, which is 79% higher than the 0.017 of ran-
domly chosen industry pairs. Conglomerates also tend to populate industries with
lower than average within industry similarity, and industries having a lower than
average number of other industries between them.
[Insert Table III Here]
In Panel B, we report results for smaller conglomerates (two or three segments)
compared to those of larger conglomerates. The table suggests that larger conglom-
erates tend to cast a wider footprint across the product market space, as they have
lower across industry similarity. They also tend to reside in industries with more
industries residing between them, and industries that have higher within industry
similarity. In Panel C of Table III, we observe that most conglomerates (30,525) are
stable from one year to the next, although 3,259 reduce in size by one segment, and
600 reduce in size by two or more segments. Analogously, 4,741 increase in size by
one segment, and 1,644 increase in size by two segments.
In Panel D, we observe that vertically related conglomerates have average across
15industry similarities that are close to the average for all conglomerate pairs. This
nding mirrors ndings in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a), who show that industry
classications based on business descriptions do not correlate with vertical relation-
ships (rather they focus on horizontal distances or economies of scope). In contrast,
across industry similarities are somewhat higher for industries having the same two
digit SIC code, as SIC codes are measures of horizontal relatedness. Both vertical
industries and those in the same two-digit SIC code also have fewer than average
industries between them.
III Results: Conglomerate Spanning
In this section we examine whether we can predict whether conglomerates produce
in particular industry pairs. We test whether across industry similarity and within
industry similarity matter for the number of conglomerate rms producing in a par-
ticular industry pair.
Table IV presents OLS regressions where each observation is a pair of three digit
SIC industries in a year derived from the set of all pairings of observed SIC-3 indus-
tries in the given year in the COMPUSTAT segment tapes. The dependent variable is
the Number of Conglomerates Spanning Pair, which is the number of conglom-
erates having segments in both industries associated with the given pair. Panel A
displays results based on the entire sample of industry pairs. Panel B displays results
for various subsamples that divide the overall sample based on the competitiveness
or the valuations of industries lying between the industry pair.
[Insert Table IV Here]
Panel A shows that higher cross industry similarity increases the number of con-
glomerate rms producing in a particular industry, while average within industry
similarity decreases the conglomerate rms producing in a particular industry. Be-
cause within industry similarity and the average HHI are moderately correlated, we
examine their eects separately. The table shows that conglomerates broadly tend
to span more concentrated markets, ie, those with higher product dierentiation and
16higher concentration. However, within industry similarity matters more and we in-
clude only this variable henceforth. Panel A also shows that the fraction of industries
between a given pair also matters, and its sign depends on the characteristics of the
industries between.
Panels B and C show that when high value and concentrated industries are be-
tween, conglomerates span the pair more often. The opposite is true for competitive
low value industries. This result shows how industry boundaries can be crossed
and redrawn presumably by using asset complementarities to span technologies that
might permit entry into previously concentrated product markets.
Table V examines how industry characteristics inuence which industry pairs are
added to conglomerates in a given year. We consider raw segment additions for
growing or stable conglomerates, and we also consider the SDC mergers and acquisi-
tions database. This allows us to separately consider segments likely added through
growth, possible reclassication, or those potentially acquired in a transaction. One
observation is one pair of segments in an existing conglomerate in year t. We require
the conglomerate rm itself to exist in year t and year t + 1.
The dependent variable varies by Panel. The dependent variable in Panel A is
the Number of Newly Added Conglomerates Spanning Pairs, which is the
number of conglomerates having new segments in both industries associated with a
given pair in a given year (where the conglomerate did not have this segment in the
previous year). In Panel B, we restrict attention to new segments in conglomerates
that previously had fewer segments in the previous year. Intuitively, these new
segments were likely added through acquisition or organic investment. In Panel
C, we restrict attention to new segments in conglomerates that previously had the
same or more segments in the previous year. Intuitively, these new segments were
likely added through reclassication of existing segments into dierent industries
(akin to a change of focus in product oerings). In Panel D, we restrict attention to
new segments in conglomerates that were the acquirer in an acquisition in the SDC
database for a transaction amounting to at least ten percent of the rm's assets. The
independent variables include various measures of the product market features of the
industry pair, and within the industries comprising the pair.
17[Insert Table V Here]
The results in Panel A of Table V show that segment pairs are likely to be added
if the across industry similarity is high. This result also has the largest coecient if
the industries between two industry pairs are highly concentrated and highly valued
(and the lowest coecient when the converse is true). This result is consistent with
conglomerate rms using two related industries to maximize asset complementari-
ties and to produce products in highly concentrated industries. We also see that
conglomerate rms are more likely to add segments when the fraction of industries
between the conglomerate pair high and the average within similarity is low. These
ndings are present especially in concentrated and highly-valued industry pairs.
The results in Panels B and D show that conglomerate segments are likely to be
obtained through growth or acquisition in these same concentrated and highly valued
industries. Conglomerate rms add segments in these industries when the industry
pair has high across industry similarity, a high fraction of industries between the
industry pair, and low average within industry similarity.
The results in this table are consistent with conglomerates choosing to expand into
industries where (a) they face less competition, (b) have more high valued industries
lying between the industry pair, (c) have high cross industry similarity, and (d) low
within industry similarity. The results are consistent with conglomerates choosing
to expand into industries with the potential for new products and related-industry
synergy gains.
Table VI examines how industry characteristics inuence which industry pairs
disappear from conglomerates. Using raw segment changes and the SDC mergers
and acquisitions database, we examine when the segment pair is likely sold or closed
as well as potentially reclassied. One observation is one pair of segments in an
existing conglomerate in year t. We require the conglomerate rm itself to exist in
year t and year t + 1.
The dependent variable again varies by Panel. In Panel A, the dependent variable
is Segment Pair Disappears, which is a dummy equal to one if the given pair
does not exist in the conglomerate's structure in the following year. In Panel B, the
18dependent variable is Segment Pair Likely Sold or Closed, which is a dummy
equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's structure in the
following year, and the conglomerate has fewer segments in year t + 1 relative to
year t. In Panel C, the dependent variable is Segment Pair Likely Reclassied,
which is a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's
structure in the following year, and the conglomerate has at least as many segments
in year t+1 relative to year t. In Panel D, the dependent variable is Segment Pair
Sold O, which is a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the
conglomerate's structure in the following year, and the conglomerate was the target
of an acquisition of at least ten percent of its assets in year t + 1.
[Insert Table VI Here]
The results in Panels A and B of Table VI show that segment pairs are less likely
to be sold or closed if the across industry similarity is high. This result also has the
largest coecient if the industries between two industry pairs are highly concentrated
and highly valued (and the lowest coecient when the converse is true). This result
is consistent with conglomerate rms using two related industries to maximize asset
complementarities and to produce products in highly concentrated industries.
The results in Panel C show that segment pairs are more likely to be reclassied
when there are other industries between them. This result is consistent with these
pairs reclassifying in order to potentially enter the markets between the given pair.
For example, because the given conglomerate has technologies that produce goods
on either side of the between industry, it is likely that the given conglomerate has
access to potential low cost entry into the between industry.
Given these strong results on which industries conglomerate rms choose to pro-
duce in and their link to potential strategic gains relating to concentration and
industry valuation, we now turn to the question of how industry composition aects
the cross-sectional variation in conglomerate valuation.
19IV Conglomerate Valuation
In this section, we explore whether information in rm product descriptions can be
used to construct more informative pure-play or single-segment benchmarks. We con-
sider both product market identication and the weighting method of single-segment
rms when reconstructing conglomerate benchmarks based on pure play rms. Fol-
lowing the existing literature, we then compare actual conglomerate valuations to
the valuation of our pure play benchmarks.
A Existing Methods
Although we depart signicantly from the literature in some of our conglomerate
valuation methods, we begin by considering a modied algorithm based on Lang and
Stulz (1994) (LS) and Berger and Ofek (1995) (BO).4 LS and BO begin by dening a
universe of candidate pure plays for each conglomerate segment. In BO, this universe
is initially dened as all pure plays operating in the rm's four digit SIC industry.
However, if the number of rms in this universe is less than ve, then the pure plays
in the given segment's three-digit industry are used. Finally, coarseness is increased
to the two digit or even the one digit level until a universe of at least ve pure
plays is identied. Because changing the level of coarseness can alter the economic
information contained in the benchmark (due to economies of scope or irrelevant
peers), we exclusively use three-digit SIC industries as our starting point following
the broader literature on industry analysis in Finance. However, we can report that
using variable levels of coarseness as used in BO produce materially similar results.
The second step following BO's framework is to compute the rm value to sales ra-
tio for each pure play rm in each segment's universe, and then compute the median.
The given segment's imputed value is then the segment's actual sales multiplied by
this median ratio. Medians are used to reduce the impact of outliers, as rm value
to sales ratios can become extreme, especially when rms have low sales or high
growth options. Finally, the imputed value of the conglomerate rm is the sum of
4Many studies including Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b) use a BO-based
method.
20the imputed values of the given conglomerate's segments. Excess value is the natural
logarithm of the conglomerate's imputed rm value divided by the conglomerate's
actual rm value. This calculation can also be done using assets as an alternative to
sales. A negative excess value, intuitively, suggests that the conglomerate is valued
less than it might otherwise be valued if it were to operate under separate pure-play
structures. We refer to this method as the \Berger+Ofek Baseline" method.
B Unconstrained Text-Based Methods
We note three key limitations of the LS and BO methods. A rst is the equal treat-
ment of all rms in a given segment's pure play universe in the median calculation.
This assumption can reduce accuracy, as additional information exists regarding the
nature of the products each pure play produces, and their comparability to a given
conglomerate. Methods that weight more relevant pure plays more heavily should
perform better. A second limitation is the use of SIC codes to identify the universe
of relevant pure play benchmarks. Methods that enhance the set of pure plays be-
yond traditional SIC boundaries, if the additional pure plays are relevant, should
perform better. A third limitation of the LS and BO method is the focus on a single
accounting characteristic such as sales or assets. Candidate pure play rms likely
vary along many other dimensions that can also explain valuation dierences. For
example, some pure plays might have very high sales growth, and might not be rele-
vant as a benchmark for a given mature conglomerate. Henceforth, we refer to these
three limitations as the \equal weighting limitation", the \limited universe limita-
tion", and the \single characteristic limitation", respectively. Text-based methods
oer a solution to all three limitations. In this section, we rst examine vocabulary
decompositions that directly address the rst two limitations. We address the third
limitation in the next section.
Although we consider many text-based methods, we adopt the approach of chang-
ing one degree of research freedom at a time. Our most basic text-based conglomerate
reconstruction method therefore holds xed the set of pure-play benchmarks used in
BO (those in the same three-digit SIC code). However, we use a textual decomposi-
tion to determine which pure plays use product vocabulary that best matches that
21of the conglomerate. This decomposition provides us with a set of weights, which we
use to replace the BO equal-weighted median calculation with a weighted median cal-
culation. To determine the weights, we use least squares to decompose the business
description of the conglomerate into parts observed in the pure play rms. Using the
same notation from Section II, Mt denotes the number of unique words in the corpus,
i denotes a given conglomerate being reconstructed, t denotes the year of the given
conglomerate observation, and Ni;t is the conglomerate's (Mt x 1) normalized word
vector. Further suppose that the given conglomerate-year observation has Nit;bench
candidate benchmark pure play rms to use in its reconstruction. Each benchmark
has its own normalized word vector. Let BENCHit denote a (Mt x Nit;bench) matrix
in which the normalized word vectors of the benchmark pure plays are appended as
columns. We thus identify the set of pure play weights (wit) that best explains the




(Nit   BENCHit  wit)
2 (2)
The solution to this problem (wit) is simply the regression slopes associated with a
no-intercept regression of the conglomerate's observed word usage Nit on the word
usage vectors of the Nit;bench pure plays. Importantly, unlike the BO method where
pure plays are treated equally, this method assigns greater weight to pure plays
whose product vocabulary best matches that of the conglomerate. Imputed value is
therefore computed by rst computing the weighted median value to sales ratio for
all Nit;bench pure plays using the weights wit. We then multiply the resulting value
to sales ratio by the conglomerate's total sales to get the conglomerate's imputed
value, and excess value is then equal to the natural logarithm of the imputed value
to actual rm value ratio. We refer to this most basic text reconstruction, which
addresses the \equal weighting limitation", as the \SIC Universe: Unconstrained"
method.
We next consider an analogous method with a single enhancement that also
addresses the \limited universe limitation". In this case, we add to the pure play
universe by adding pure play rms that are in the conglomerate's VIC-7.06 industry
as dened in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). These rms have products that are similar
22to the conglomerate's product description, and the VIC-7.06 industry classication
is equally as coarse as are SIC-3 industries. The calculation follows as described
above, except in this case the number of benchmarks Nit;bench is as large (if no pure
play VIC-7.06 peers exist) or larger (if pure play VIC-7.06 peers do exist). We refer
to this method as the \SIC+VIC Universe: Unconstrained" method.
C Constrained Text-Based Methods
We next consider the third limitation, the \single characteristic limitation". The LS
and BO method has an underlying assumption that a single rm characteristic, for
example sales or assets, is a sucient statistic to explain a pure play's rm value.
Because asset valuations are forward looking and depend on fundamentals (such as
protability), this limitation is quite severe. We consider a constrained least squares
approach to construct a pure-play based imputed value that holds any number of
accounting characteristics xed to those of the conglomerate itself.
Using the same notation, suppose a conglomerate has Nit;bench candidate pure play
rms. Suppose the researcher identies Nchar accounting characteristics they wish to
hold xed when computing imputed valuations. In our case, we consider Nchar = 5,
and account for the following ve accounting characteristics: Sales Growth, Log Age,
OI/Sales, OI/Assets, and R&D/Sales. Let Cit denote a Nchar x 1 vector containing
the conglomerate's actual characteristics for these ve variables. Let Zit denote a
Nit;bench x Nchar matrix in which one row contains the value of these ve character-
istics for one of the pure play benchmark candidates. We then consider the set of
weights wit that solve the following constrained optimization:
MIN
wit
(Nit   BENCHit  wit)
2 such that Z
0
itwit = Cit (3)
The solution to this problem (wit) is simply the slopes associated with a no-intercept
constrained regression of the conglomerate's observed word usage Nit on the word





















23Intuitively, this set of weights identies the set of pure plays that use vocabulary
that can best reconstruct the conglomerate's own vocabulary, and that also exactly
match the conglomerate on the Nchar characteristics. We refer to this method as the
\SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained" method.
D Accounting for Segment Sales
The LS and BO method computes imputed values segment-by-segment, and there-
fore utilizes information contained in reported segment-by-segment sales. To the
extent that sales explains valuations better than other characteristics, this informa-
tion might be useful. The basic text-based methods described above do not use
segment-by-segment sales, and instead rely on the weights obtained from the textual
reconstruction to derive imputed value. We believe that it is an empirical question
as to whether textual weights or sales weights best explain valuations. However, it is
important to explore this question. We therefore consider a method that is identical
to the \SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained" method described above, except that we
add an additional set of constraints based on the segment sales to ensure that the
imputed value is weighted by sales across segments as is the case for the BO method.
Consider a conglomerate having Nit;seg segments, and let Sit denote the Nit;seg x 1
vector of sales weights (one element being a given segment's sales divided by the total
sales of the conglomerate). To compute imputed values that impose segment sales-
based weights, we make two modications to the constrained optimization. First, we
append the vector Sit to the vector Cit. Second, we create a Nit;bench x Nit;seg matrix
of ones and zeros. A given element is one if the pure play associated with the given
row is in the industry space corresponding to the given segment of the conglomerate
associated with the given column. This matrix is populated based on how the pure-
play benchmarks are selected. If the benchmark is selected due to its residing in a
three digit SIC industry of a given segment, then the given pure play rm is allocated
to that segment. If the benchmark was selected due to its residing in the VIC-7.06
industry of the conglomerate itself, then it is allocated to the segment whose SIC-
benchmarks it is most similar (as measured using the cosine similarity method).
We then append this Nit;bench x Nit;seg matrix of ones and zeros to the matrix Zit.
24The solution to the resulting constrained optimization is a set of new weights wit
that has the property that the sum of weights allocated to each segment equals
the given segment's sales divided by the total conglomerate sales ratio. Therefore,
imputed values can be computed segment by segment. We refer to this method as
the \SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained, Segment-by-Segment" method.
V Results: Conglomerate Valuation
In this section, we rst assess the quality of conglomerate reconstruction using the
several dierent reconstruction methods discussed earlier. We focus on the accuracy
of valuation relative to the observed conglomerate valuations, and we also readdress
the question regarding whether or not conglomerates trade at a discount relative to
what they might trade at under a non-conglomerate structure. We conclude this
section by examining hypotheses regarding which types of conglomerates have high
or low valuations, and explore conglomerate valuations in cross section.
A Methodological Validation
Following the methodology discussion in Section IV, we examine excess valuations
using ve dierent conglomerate reconstruction methods. In particular, we con-
sider the Berger and Ofek (1995) benchmark, and four text based methods aimed at
addressing key limitations in the BO method. Table VII displays average excess val-
uations, and mean squared error statistics based on these ve methods. Mean excess
value calculations are useful to explore if conglomerates trade at discounts (negative
excess valuations) or premia (positive excess valuations), and mean squared error
statistics are useful to compare the relative valuation accuracy of valuation methods.
A method with a lower MSE generates excess valuations that are closer to the mean
excess valuation, and are therefore more accurate. Following convention in the liter-
ature in Panels B and C, we discard an excess value calculation if it is outside the
range f 1:386;+1:386g (in actual levels instead of natural logs this range is f1
4;4g),
to reduce the eect of outliers. Therefore, the observation counts available for each
valuation method vary slightly. In particular, more accurate valuation methods gen-
25erate excess valuations outside this range less often, and thus have higher observation
counts. The table reports mean excess value, MSE statistics, and observation counts
for excess value calculations based on sales (rst three columns) and assets (last three
columns).
Following conventions in the literature, we apply many screens to the conglom-
erate sample included in this part of our study. In particular, we require lagged
COMPUSTAT data for our control variables, we drop rms with sales less than $20
million, rms with zero assets, and rms for which summed segment sales disagrees
with the overall rm's sales by more than 1%. We also require that 10-K text data
is available, and also that a sucient number of pure play rms exist in segment
industries to compute excess valuations. In Panel A of VII we include all observa-
tions. In Panel B, following the convention in the literature, we restrict attention
to excess values less than 400% and greater than 25% (screen applied separately for
each method). In Panel C, we omit all rm-years for a conglomerate in which its
estimated excess value is outside this range using any calculation method we consider
(as this allows a comparison that holds the sample size xed).
[Insert Table VII Here]
Panel A of Table VII shows that more rened text-based valuation methods
generate smaller conglomerate discounts. For excess valuations based on sales, the
8.2% discount for the Berger and Ofek benchmark in row one declines to just 1.2%
using the text-based method that addresses all three limitations. The most basic text-
based benchmark, which holds xed the same SIC-universe of pure play candidates,
results in a decline in the excess value discount to 5.8%. Therefore, just changing the
weighting of single segment rms alone is partially but not fully responsible for our
ability to explain the discount. Row 3 of Panel A expands the universe to include
VIC-7.06 pure play rivals of the conglomerate. This expansion reduces the discount
to 4.6%. Finally, using the ve key accounting characteristics in Row 4 reduces the
discount to 1.2%. In row 5 of Panel A, we see that further constraining the weights
to match segment-specic sales ratios increases the discount to just 1.8%.
When excess valuation is based on assets in the fourth column, we see that the
26discount of -2.7% using the Berger and Ofek benchmark declines analogously to
nearly zero (0.1%) using the constrained text-based benchmark in row four. We
conclude that our ability to explain the benchmark is due to three factors: (1) Using
weights based on textual decompositions, (2) improving the benchmark candidates
to include both SIC and VIC peers, and (3) constraining the benchmark to have
similar accounting characteristics relative to the conglomerate being reconstructed.
Columns two and four, which report mean squared error statistics, strongly sup-
port the conclusion that the constrained model based on the enlarged SIC+VIC
universe oers the most accurate conglomerate pricing. When based on sales, the
mean squared error in row 4 of .320 is 32.4% smaller than the mean squared error
of .474 associated with the Berger and Ofek benchmark. When based on assets, this
improvement is 27.7%.
In Panels B and C, we omit excess valuations outside the interval f 1:386;+1:386g.
Panel B omits just the method-specic conglomerate-year observations in which ex-
cess valuations are outside this range and Panel C omits the rm if any of the ve
valuation method places the value outside this range. The results are similar to Panel
A. We see the discount in excess value disappearing using our text-based methods. In
Panel C in particular, the excess value discount entirely disappears for both the sales
based and the asset based methods. We also see large decreases in mean squared
error using our text-based methods. The results in Panel C are especially clean
because the sample size is held xed across methods.
We conclude that improving conglomerate benchmarks alone can explain the pre-
viously reported conglomerate discount, and dramatically improve valuation accu-
racy. The intuition behind this result squares well with the original intent: a portfolio
of pure plays that matches the conglomerate in operations and assets should be a
valid benchmark to the conglomerate itself. Our results therefore do not support the
conclusion that conglomerate rms trade at discounts. These ndings are in line with
other recent studies that draw the same conclusion using other methods (see Campa
and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004b), and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002)).
In Table VIII, we assess whether conglomerates reconstructed using the various
27methods discussed above have similar characteristics as the conglomerates them-
selves. As the objective of these methods is to rebuild an identical replica of what
the conglomerate would look like under a non-conglomerate structure, better bench-
marks should match the conglomerate along more dimensions. For example, they
should have similar sales growth, should be equally as mature, should be as protable,
and they should have similar investment intensities.
To address this question, we rst compute implied characteristic values using the
same methods used to compute imputed valuations in the excess value valuations.
For example, the implied Sales Growth of a Berger and Ofek (baseline) benchmark is
computed as the sales weighted average of the segment-by-segment computed median
sales growth of the pure plays in each segment's three digit SIC industry. For a text-
based benchmark, the weighted median sales growth is the implied sales growth of
the conglomerate.
[Insert Table VIII Here]
Table VIII reports correlations between the actual conglomerate characteristic
and the implied characteristic for each characteristic noted in the rst column using
each valuation method noted in the remaining columns. Comparing correlations be-
tween the single-segment constructed benchmarks and the actual conglomerate rms
using the Berger and Ofek benchmark to the text-based benchmarks reveals that the
text-based benchmarks strongly outperform the Berger and Ofek baseline in terms
of matching characteristics. The simplest text based methods that do not constrain
accounting characteristics (columns two and three) have higher correlations than the
Berger and Ofek constructed conglomerate benchmark. For example, the 28.9% cor-
relation between the OI/Assets of the actual conglomerate and the Berger and Ofek
benchmark increases dramatically to (35.7% to 42.1%) even using unconstrained
text-based weights. As indicated in the methodology section, the text-based weights
are purely a function of the vocabulary used by the pure plays and the conglomerate,
and are not mechanistically related to the accounting numbers that these methods
are better able to match. In the last two columns, not surprisingly, we observed that
Pearson correlations rise dramatically when we use the text-based constrained opti-
28mization. As these weights use ve key accounting characteristics to better t each
conglomerate's mapping, it is not surprising that these characteristic correlations are
higher. We conclude that text based measures oer substantial improvements over
existing methods.
It is also natural to ask which type of pure play rms are weighted more than
others when reconstructing conglomerates and giving dierential weights to compo-
nent single-segment rms. Panel A of Table IX explores this question and displays
average characteristics for rms assigned weights in the highest and lowest quartile
using the text-based conglomerate benchmarks. Panel B further examines how the
weights on the single-segment benchmark rms vary when we examine how well the
vocabularies of the pure plays t the vocabulary of the conglomerate (we dene the
\Diculty of Pure Plays to Replicate the Conglomerate" as one minus the R2 from
the vocabulary decomposition).
The rst three columns of Panel A are based on the \SIC+VIC universe (uncon-
strained)" method. This method is text based and uses an enhanced set of eligible
pure plays (SIC and VIC peers) to reconstruct the conglomerates. In the second
three columns in Table IX, we repeat the same exercise using the \SIC+VIC universe
(constrained)" method, which also holds xed key accounting variables as discussed
earlier.
[Insert Table IX Here]
Panel A shows shows that pure play rms receiving higher weights using text de-
compositions tend to be older, are more mature rms, and have lower sales growth.
These rms also have less research and development, and are more protable than
those pure plays assigned lower weights. Because mature rms have lower valua-
tion ratios, this might explain why conglomerates appear undervalued using earlier
methods.
The results in the latter three columns are similar to those in the rst three
columns, but notably sharper. For example, the average dierence in age is nearly
7.5 years using the constrained text method, compared to just 4.4 years using the
unconstrained text method. We conclude that equal weighting all pure plays, as was
29done using the Berger and Ofek benchmark, will overweight high growth rms and
thus generate the inappropriate conclusion that conglomerates are undervalued. Our
results in the next section formally conrm this conjecture.
Panel B Table IX provides a similar comparison of characteristics but splits the
sample based on which rms have above or below median \Diculty of Pure Plays to
Replicate" measures (1 - R2 from the textual decomposition regression in equation
(3)). A conglomerate that is dicult to replicate has an R2 of zero and a \Diculty
of Pure Plays to Replicate" value of 1. This constrained regression is run once per
conglomerate-year, as this provides us with the weights used to construct the excess
values year by year as discussed in the previous section. This same calculation thus
provides one diculty to replicate statistic for each conglomerate in each year..
Panel B shows that conglomerates with concentrated industries and high-value
industries between their segments have the sharpest correlations between diculty
to replicate and the fractions of industries lying between the pair. This nding
adds to our earlier evidence that conglomerates spanning these high value industries
generating more product market synergies, as these same synergies can explain why
the pure plays cannot replicate the conglomerate as easily.
B Determinants of Conglomerate Valuations
In this section, we examine whether conglomerate valuations vary in cross section.
As discussed in our hypotheses section (Section I), we focus on examining whether
conglomerates that are harder to replicate and face less competition have higher
valuations relative to our pure-play based benchmarks. To explore this question, we
regress conglomerate excess valuation on the text-based variables that capture these
factors.
We regress conglomerate-year excess valuations on the \Diculty of Pure Plays
to Replicate" variable, along with the fraction of industries between the conglomerate
industry segments, our concentration measures as discussed above, and our across
and within industry similarity measures. We also include controls for document
length, vertical relatedness, and a number of accounting measures used in the existing
30literature.
Our variable for the \Diculty of Pure Plays to Replicate" captures how easily
the conglomerate can be reconstructed using the set of pure play rms that exist in
its markets. The intuition underlying this calculation is that a conglomerate that
is more dicult to replicate is more protected and dierentiated, and hence faces
less of a competitive threat. For example, any asset complementarities or product
market synergies created through its conglomerate structure cannot be easily raided
by any new conglomerates that might form based on existing pure plays.
The fraction of industries between the conglomerate industry segment captures
the potential gains a conglomerate can reap by expanding its product oerings into
these between markets. Average across industry similarity captures the potential
for synergies between industries. Within industry similarity and the average con-
centration of a conglomerate's pure play markets capture the competition that a
conglomerate rm faces withing its pure-play markets.
[Insert Table X Here]
Table X displays the results of OLS panel data regressions in which one observa-
tion is one conglomerate in one year, and the dependent variable is the excess valu-
ation using the constrained text-based valuation method (Panel A) and the Berger
and Ofek (1995) valuation method (Panel B). t-statistics are shown in parentheses,
and standard errors are adjusted for clustering by rm.
Our rst key nding is that the diculty of pure plays to replicate variable is
positive and highly statistically signicant in both panels. This is our main result.
Conglomerates that are harder to replicate have high valuations relative to pure play
benchmarks. As this variable captures the uniqueness of the conglomerate's products
relative to the pure play benchmarks, one would not expect its aect on valuation
to be negated out in the dierence as was the case for the average HHI variable.
This nding, which is robust at the 1% level of signicance in all rows, is consistent
with these rms earning higher rents due to the inability of other rms to enter their
product markets. Hence the product market synergies or asset complementarities
that the given rm enjoys under the conglomerate structure are not vulnerable. Our
31control variables indicate that conglomerates are also valued more when they have
more investment (R+D and Capital Expenditures), when they are more protable,
and when they are larger. Conglomerates are also less valuable when their segments
are vertically related.
We also nd that the reported R2s are higher in Panel B than in Panel A. This
result arises because our text-based valuation model is a better t as shown previously
than the Berger and Ofek method. If reconstructed benchmarks are perfect, fewer
variables should be capable of explaining valuations in the cross section. The table
also shows that the level of signicance of our key variable, diculty of pure plays
to replicate, is quite similar across panels.
Other ndings in the table is that traditional segment-by-segment average within
segment similarity and the average concentration ratio (Conglomerate Average Con-
centration)are not signicantly related to excess valuations in the full model in Row
(1), although they are both signicant when the Diculty to Replicate variable is
excluded in rows (3) and (5). These results are not surprising because the pure play
rms used to construct the excess valuation benchmark enjoy the same level of con-
centration on average. Therefore, the excess valuation, which is a dierence, would
come close to negating any eect of this concentration variable on average.
Table XI displays the economic magnitudes of our ndings regarding the di-
culty of pure plays to replicate variable. In each year, we sort rms into quintiles
based on this variable, and we compute the average excess valuation for each group.
We also compute the average residual excess valuation, where residuals are from a
regression of excess valuation on all of the variables in Table X with the exception
of the diculty to replicate variable. The table shows that raw excess valuations are
modestly higher for the highest quintile (+5.4% using the text-based model) relative
to the lowest quintile (-2.3% ). This eect is magnied for average residual excess
valuations (+9.1% versus -4.8% ). We conclude that the impact of a conglomerate's
diculty to reconstruct is meaningful, and that conglomerates that are more dicult
to replicate trade at modest premia relative to their pure play benchmarks.
[Insert Table XI Here]
32Our last table examines conglomerate excess valuation for subsamples based on
which industries conglomerate rms operate within. Panel A of Table XII consid-
ers conglomerates with high-value industries (above median) between their segment
pairs, and Panel B examines conglomerate excess value for conglomerates with low-
value industries (below median) between their segment pairs.
[Insert Table XII Here]
The results in Panel A, as compared to Panel B, show that the \Diculty of
Pure Plays to Replicate" variable is signicant in both panels but signicantly larger
for high-value industries. We can also see that the fraction of industries between is
positive and signicant for high-value industries but insignicant for conglomerates
with low-value industries between their industry pairs. As in Table X, the diculty to
replicate variable subsumes other product market variables, as this is a comprehensive
measure of how dierentiated the conglomerate is from potential rivals in all of its
markets.
Overall these results, combined with those in Table X, are consistent with con-
glomerates having higher valuations when their products are dicult to replicate
with the best possible single-segment peers. Our results are also consistent with
conglomerates trading at a discount when their products are very similar to those
produced by single-segment peers. The results are consistent with conglomerates
trading at premia and adding value when they are able to generate synergies and
produce products that are not produced by single-segment peers.
VI Conclusions
We use text-based analysis of conglomerate and pure play business descriptions from
10-Ks led with the SEC to examine in which industries conglomerates are most
likely to operate and to understand cross-sectional conglomerate valuation. We nd
that conglomerate rms are more likely to operate in industry pairs that are closer
together in the product space, in industry pairs that have protable opportunities
\between" them, and in industries with lower within industry product similarity.
33These ndings are consistent with product synergies, from related industry produc-
tion and also from conglomerates producing in related industries being able to enter
protable industries that lie between them.
We also nd that conglomerate rms are less likely to produce in industries with
high within industry similarity and in industries that span competitive industries.
These ndings are consistent with conglomerate rms choosing to produce in the
more concentrated industries with higher protability.
We examine the cross-sectional valuation eects of conglomerate industry pro-
duction. Using text-based analysis we redene benchmark single-industry segment
\pure-play" rms for each industry segment of conglomerate rms using product-
word vocabulary matching. We also use text based analysis to weight these pure-play
benchmarks to match the conglomerate rm on multiple accounting characteristics
in addition to product word matching.
We nd that on average conglomerates do not trade at a discount relative to
text-matched single segment rms. More importantly, this average eect masks
important cross-sectional variation. We nd that conglomerates that are more di-
cult to reconstruct using pure-play rms tend to trade at modest premia and those
conglomerates that are easier to replicate trade at discounts. These ndings are
consistent with higher valued conglomerate rms producing in related highly-valued
industries that have product synergies.
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36Table I: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are reported for our sample of conglomerate and pure play rms (Panel A), Industry Pairs and
conglomerates (Panel B), and Conglomerate Segment Pairs (Panel C) for our sample from 1996 to 2008. The
variables in Panel A include the VIC-7.06 HHI and the total rm value (book debt plus market value of equity).
The variables in Panel B include product market measures describing an industry pair. The Number of
Conglomerates Spanning Pair is the number of conglomerates having segments in both industries associated
with the given pair. Across Industry Similarity is the average pairwise similarity between rms in one of the
industries in the pair, and rms in the other industry. The Fraction of Industries Between Pair is the fraction
of all other SIC-3 industries residing in the product market space \between" or closer in product space than the
two industries comprising the pair. Zero Industries Between is a dummy equal to one if no industries are
between i and j. To compute Average Within Industry Similarity, we rst compute the average pairwise
similarity of rms in industry i and j, and average the two measures. The Average HHI is computed analogously
by averaging the VIC-7.06 HHI of rms in each industry, and taking the average of the two. The Pair Likelihood
if Random is a control variable equal to the fraction of all pure play rms in industry i, multiplied by the fraction
of all pure play rms in industry j (multiplied by 10,000 for convenience). The Same 2-digit SIC Dummy is a
dummy equal to one of industries i and j share the same two digit SIC code. Vertical Relatedness is the average
fraction of input the two industries in an industry pair obtain from one another (from the input-output tables).
The variables in Panel C identify changes in conglomerate structures using the Compustat segment denitions and
the SDC acquisition database. One observation is a pair of segments in an existing conglomerate in year t, and we
require that the conglomerate exist in year t and t + 1.
Std.
Variable Mean Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A: Conglomerates (15,373 obs) and Pure-Plays (56,491 obs)
Firm Value (Conglomerates) 12430 48462 0.483 1228 1036340
Firm Value (Pure-Plays) 2450 18863 0.003 215. 1038648
VIC HHI (Conglomerates) 0.140 0.219 0.006 0.059 1.000
VIC HHI (Pure-Plays) 0.111 0.153 0.006 0.058 1.000
Panel B: Industry Pairs (312,240 obs) and Conglomerates (15,373 obs)
Number of Conglomerates Spanning Pair (Ind. Pairs) 0.147 0.855 0.0 0.0 57.0
Across Industry Similarity (Ind. Pairs) 0.017 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.169
Across Industry Similarity (Conglomerates) 0.032 0.019 0.000 0.025 0.138
Fraction of Industries Between Pair (Ind. Pairs) 0.325 0.257 0.000 0.267 0.992
Fraction of Industries Between Pair (Conglomerates) 0.097 0.133 0.000 0.042 0.992
Within Industry Similarity (Ind. Pairs) 0.086 0.038 0.000 0.081 0.433
Within Industry Similarity (Conglomerates) 0.073 0.030 0.010 0.066 0.188
Same 2-digit SIC Dummy (Ind. Pairs) 0.018 0.133 0.000 0.000 1.000
Same 2-digit SIC Dummy (Conglomerates) 0.228 0.371 0.000 0.000 1.000
Vertical Relatedness (Ind. Pairs) 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.536
Vertical Relatedness (Conglomerates) 0.027 0.066 0.000 0.006 0.536
Variable Obs Percentage Std. Dev.
Panel C: Change in Conglomerate Segment Pair Variables (32,181 obs)
Segment Pair Disappears 4,566 14.2% 34.9%
Segment Pair Likely Sold or Closed 3,415 10.6% 30.8%
Segment Pair Likely Reclassied 1,096 3.4% 18.1%
Segment Pair Likely Sold O 330 1.0% 10.1%
37Table II: Pearson Correlation Coecients
Pearson Correlation Coecients are reported for our sample of 312,240 observations of three digit SIC industry pairs from 1996 to 2008. The variables include various measures of the
product market topography between the industry pair, and within the industries comprising the pair. Please see Table I for a description of the variables.
Number of Zero Pair Same
Spanning Across Industries Fraction of Within Aver- Likelihood 2-digit
Conglom. Industry Between Industries Industry age if SIC
Row Variable Pairs Similarity Dummy Between Similarity HHI Random Dummy
Correlation Coecients
(1) Across Industry Similarity 0.229
(2) Zero Industries Between Dummy 0.160 0.446
(3) Fraction of Industries Between Pair -0.132 -0.691 -0.137
(4) Within Industry Similarity -0.044 0.184 0.058 -0.092
(5) Average HHI -0.011 -0.176 -0.042 0.088 -0.487
(6) Pair Likelihood if Random 0.144 -0.009 0.020 -0.002 -0.020 -0.031
(7) Same 2-digit SIC Dummy 0.231 0.315 0.200 -0.135 -0.030 0.020 0.012
(8) Vertical Relatedness 0.200 0.165 0.078 -0.124 -0.049 0.055 0.028 0.155
3
8Table III: Conglomerate Summary
Summary statistics showing various mean characteristics across various subsamples of industry pairs from 1996 to
2008. Industries are based on three-digit SIC industries. Results are based on our sample of 312,240 industry pair x
year permutations, and 40,769 observed conglomerate industry pair x year observations. In Panel A, we display
summary statistics for all observed conglomerate pairs, and we compare them to the statistics of randomly drawn
industry pairs. In Panel B, we display summary statistics for conglomerates of varying size. In Panel C, we show
results for conglomerates that are growing, stable, or shrinking, as noted in the rst column. In Panel D, we show
results for vertically integrated segments, and segments in the same two-digit SIC code. Please see Table I for a
description of the variables displayed.
Across Within Fraction of
Industry Industry Average Industries
Sub Sample Similarity Similarity HHI Between # Obs.
Panel A: Overall
All Conglomerates 0.0296 0.0768 0.1150 0.1293 40,769
Randomly Drawn SIC-3 Industries 0.0167 0.0862 0.1183 0.3255 312,240
Panel B: By Conglomerate Size
2 Segments 0.0341 0.0738 0.1192 0.0867 6,365
3 Segments 0.0311 0.0750 0.1164 0.1132 11,672
4-5 Segments 0.0289 0.0786 0.1130 0.1366 15,794
6+ Segments 0.0247 0.0785 0.1133 0.1790 6,938
Panel C: Shrinking, Stable, and Growing Conglomerates
Shrink by 2+ Segments 0.0268 0.0788 0.1097 0.1490 600
Shrink by 1 Segment 0.0295 0.0779 0.1119 0.1296 3,259
Stable Conglomerate 0.0301 0.0769 0.1160 0.1260 30,525
Add 1 Segment 0.0282 0.0760 0.1117 0.1414 4,741
Add 2+ Segments 0.0262 0.0739 0.1135 0.1485 1,644
Panel D: Vertical and Same SIC-2 Conglomerates
Vertically Related Segments 0.0319 0.0717 0.1212 0.0739 15,007
Same SIC-2 Segments 0.0471 0.0829 0.1085 0.0291 8,015
39Table IV: Where Conglomerates Exist
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by year for our sample of 312,240 industry pairs from 1996 to 2008. One observation is one pair of three digit SIC industries in a year
derived from the set of all pairings of observed SIC-3 industries in the given year in the COMPUSTAT segment tapes. The dependent variable is the Number of Conglomerates
Spanning Pair, which is the number of conglomerates having segments in both industries associated with the given pair. Panel A displays results based on the entire sample of
industry pairs. Panel B displays results for various subsamples based on the competitiveness or the valuations of industries lying between the industry pair. Panel C displays results
based on subsamples of valuations and competitiveness. The independent variables include various measures of the product market features of the industry pair and within the
industries comprising the pair. Please see Table I for a description of the independent variables. Panel regressions are estimated with year xed eects and standard errors are
clustered by year (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Fraction of Avg. Pair
Across Industries Zero Within Aver- Likeli- Same Vertical
Industry Between Industries Industry age hood if 2-digit Relat- # Obs. /
Row Sample Similarity Pair Between Similarity HHI Random SIC Code edness RSQ
Panel A: Full Sample
(1) All Industry Pairs 14.060 0.060 0.410 -1.347 0.084 0.943 8.669 312,240
(19.98) (4.85) (6.20) (-13.90) (9.32) (18.94) (7.00) 0.128
(2) All Industry Pairs 12.809 0.045 0.423 0.181 0.085 0.973 8.869 312,240
(18.94) (3.45) (6.40) (4.05) (9.42) (19.14) (7.13) 0.125
Panel B: Univariate Subsamples
(3) Concentrated Industry Pairs 27.374 0.249 -1.034 0.086 0.638 3.715 154,324
(11.15) (6.32) (-18.74) (6.65) (8.57) (7.56) 0.110
(4) Competitive Industry Pairs 12.730 -0.050 -1.625 0.076 1.044 8.033 154,321
(16.76) (-1.89) (-11.18) (6.07) (20.31) (7.67) 0.103
(5) High Firm Value Industry Pairs 21.110 0.190 -1.260 0.063 1.199 5.695 154,326
(12.96) (5.51) (-11.80) (6.19) (19.43) (4.14) 0.100
(6) Low Firm Value Industry Pairs 11.380 -0.010 -1.453 0.120 0.743 8.491 154,319
(15.52) (-1.43) (-10.86) (5.91) (12.26) (12.13) 0.124
Panel C: Bivariate Subsamples
(7) Concentrated and High Value Pairs 38.414 0.425 -0.865 0.066 0.779 3.207 65,904
(6.04) (4.29) (-12.71) (3.99) (5.53) (4.11) 0.113
(8) Competitive and High Value Pairs 19.416 0.160 -1.534 0.062 1.294 6.165 88,422
(12.14) (3.11) (-10.37) (5.93) (16.84) (3.93) 0.097
(9) Concentrated and Low Value Pairs 22.061 0.146 -1.153 0.113 0.595 3.937 88,420
(8.88) (4.20) (-13.12) (4.06) (7.94) (7.39) 0.114
(10) Competitive and Low Value Pairs 8.544 -0.258 -1.813 0.124 0.817 10.600 65,899
(9.38) (-14.40) (-9.73) (4.70) (13.45) (8.77) 0.127
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0Table V: New Conglomerate Segments
OLS regressions which examine the number of new conglomerate segments in each three-digit SIC codes pairs in
the given year in the COMPUSTAT segment tapes. Panel A counts the number of new conglomerates producing in
both industries of a given three-digit pair. In Panel B, new segments are from conglomerates that previously had
fewer segments in the previous year. In Panel C, new segments are from conglomerates that previously had the
same or more segments in the previous year. Panel D restricts new segments to conglomerates that were the
acquirer in an acquisition in the SDC database for a transaction amounting to at least ten percent of the rm's
assets. The independent variables include product market features of the industry pair. Please see Table I for a
description of the independent variables. Panel regressions are estimated with year xed eects and standard errors
are clustered by year (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Fraction Avg. Pair Same
Across Industries Within Likeli- 2-digit Vertical
Industry Between Industry hood if SIC Relat- Obs.
Row Sample Similarity Pair Simil. Random Code edness /RSQ
Panel A: Dep. Var = New Segment Pairs
(1) All Industry Pairs 2.409 0.010 -0.268 0.017 0.124 0.756 312,240
(5.56) (3.23) (-4.41) (3.86) (4.69) (2.61) 0.052
(2) Concen. + High Value 6.016 0.065 -0.160 0.016 0.130 0.519 65,904
(4.13) (3.11) (-4.78) (2.50) (2.61) (1.96) 0.051
(3) Concen. + Low Value 2.348 -0.009 -0.337 0.014 0.155 0.541 88,422
(7.02) (-0.84) (-4.49) (3.42) (5.85) (2.08) 0.046
(4) Compet. + High Value 3.051 0.021 -0.176 0.019 0.076 0.758 88,420
(4.15) (2.63) (-4.39) (3.56) (2.58) (2.91) 0.038
(5) Compet. + Low Value 1.416 -0.036 -0.341 0.024 0.111 0.829 65,899
(3.16) (-3.69) (-3.75) (2.77) (3.60) (2.45) 0.049
Panel B: Dep. Var = New Segment Pairs Likely Obtained through Growth
(6) All Industry Pairs 1.994 0.009 -0.213 0.014 0.101 0.614 312,240
(4.92) (3.84) (-3.99) (3.61) (4.29) (2.37) 0.048
(7) Concen. + High Value 4.249 0.042 -0.125 0.014 0.130 0.415 65,904
(4.36) (3.37) (-4.06) (2.30) (2.61) (1.60) 0.046
(8) Concen. + Low Value 1.826 -0.010 -0.272 0.012 0.125 0.479 88,422
(5.26) (-1.01) (-4.14) (3.25) (5.74) (2.18) 0.043
(9) Compet. + High Value 2.384 0.016 -0.134 0.015 0.062 0.602 88,420
(3.63) (2.29) (-4.20) (3.05) (2.50) (2.76) 0.033
(10) Compet. + Low Value 1.260 -0.028 -0.272 0.022 0.087 0.640 65,899
(3.17) (-3.11) (-3.31) (2.67) (3.06) (2.07) 0.046
Panel C: Dep. Var = New Segment Pairs Likely From Reclassication
(11) All Industry Pairs 0.415 0.001 -0.054 0.002 0.023 0.142 65,899
(6.92) (0.64) (-5.93) (5.21) (5.54) (3.38) 0.011
(12) Concen. + High Value 1.767 0.023 -0.035 0.002 0.000 0.105 65,904
(2.61) (2.23) (-3.94) (3.38) (0.10) (1.97) 0.010
(13) Concen. + Low Value 0.521 0.001 -0.065 0.002 0.030 0.062 88,422
(4.12) (0.33) (-5.33) (4.13) (4.13) (1.32) 0.011
(14) Compet. + High Value 0.667 0.005 -0.042 0.003 0.014 0.156 88,420
(3.71) (2.11) (-4.75) (5.47) (1.95) (2.86) 0.009
(15) Compet. + Low Value 0.156 -0.008 -0.069 0.002 0.023 0.190 65,899
(2.24) (-3.20) (-4.40) (2.83) (4.78) (2.90) 0.010
Panel D: Dep. Var = New Segment Pairs Linked to SDC Acquisitions
(16) All Industry Pairs 0.239 0.002 -0.019 0.001 0.004 0.073 312,240
(3.99) (2.09) (-3.13) (2.43) (1.79) (2.31) 0.007
(17) Concen. + High Value 0.605 0.007 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.036 65,904
(2.44) (2.22) (-3.20) (1.81) (-0.35) (1.24) 0.005
(18) Concen. + Low Value 0.260 0.001 -0.021 0.001 0.006 0.046 88,422
(4.19) (0.46) (-2.88) (2.36) (1.78) (1.53) 0.007
(19) Compet. + High Value 0.278 0.002 -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.040 88,420
(2.41) (1.32) (-3.27) (3.49) (1.07) (2.27) 0.004
(20) Compet. + Low Value 0.176 -0.002 -0.033 0.001 0.005 0.091 65,899
(2.18) (-0.72) (-2.91) (1.52) (2.03) (1.35) 0.007
41Table VI: Which Segments Exit
Logit regressions with standard errors clustered by year for our sample of 32,181 industry pairs from 1997 to 2008.
One observation is one pair of segments in an existing conglomerate in year t. The conglomerate rm itself has to
exist in year t and year t + 1. The dependent variable varies by Panel. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
Segment Pair Disappears, which is a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's
structure in the following year. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Segment Pair Likely Sold or Closed,
which is a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's structure in the following year,
and the conglomerate has fewer segments in year t + 1 relative to year t. In Panel C, the dependent variable is
Segment Pair Likely Reclassied, which is a dummy equal to one if the given pair does not exist in the
conglomerate's structure in the following year, and the conglomerate has at least as many segments in year t + 1
relative to year t. In Panel D, the dependent variable is Segment Pair Sold O, which is a dummy equal to one
if the given pair does not exist in the conglomerate's structure in the following year, and the conglomerate was the
target of an acquisition of at least ten percent of its assets in year t + 1. Please see Table I for a description of the
independent variables. All regressions are estimated with year xed eects and standard errors are clustered by
year (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Fraction Avg. Pair Same
Across Industries Within Likeli- 2-digit Vertical
Industry Between Industry hood if SIC Relat- Obs.
Row Sample Similarity Pair Simil. Random Code edness /RSQ
Panel A: Dep. Var = Segment Pair Disappears
(1) All Pairs -6.557 0.282 0.362 0.004 -0.043 -1.724 32,181
(-2.94) (1.75) (0.32) (0.67) (-1.23) (-4.13) 0.015
(2) Concen. + High Value -17.662 -0.047 -2.029 0.013 -0.146 -0.213 7,387
(-2.83) (-0.15) (-1.20) (1.53) (-1.16) (-0.17) 0.015
(3) Compet. + High Value -10.653 -0.120 0.498 -0.004 -0.135 -2.493 6,976
(-3.45) (-0.13) (0.31) (-0.43) (-2.15) (-2.27) 0.024
(4) Concen. + Low Value -15.653 0.024 0.259 0.006 -0.131 1.076 8,706
(-2.40) (0.09) (0.13) (0.51) (-1.50) (0.60) 0.011
(5) Compet. + Low Value -3.574 2.919 0.896 -0.014 0.005 -1.192 5,636
(-0.78) (1.33) (0.68) (-0.69) (0.09) (-2.17) 0.013
Panel B: Dep. Var = Segment Pair Likely Sold or Closed
(6) All Pairs -8.521 -0.004 1.166 0.008 -0.137 -1.692 32,181
(-3.14) (-0.02) (0.98) (1.17) (-2.37) (-3.48) 0.009
(7) Concen. + High Value -22.566 -0.507 -1.110 0.015 -0.424 0.124 7,387
(-3.18) (-2.03) (-0.50) (1.67) (-2.43) (0.19) 0.011
(8) Compet. + High Value -14.508 -1.009 0.065 -0.003 -0.221 -2.499 6,976
(-2.46) (-0.99) (0.04) (-0.24) (-1.91) (-1.99) 0.016
(9) Concen. + Low Value -14.934 -0.262 1.662 0.009 -0.198 1.336 8,706
(-2.09) (-0.94) (1.01) (0.83) (-2.92) (0.91) 0.007
(10) Compet. + Low Value -6.072 1.303 2.356 -0.004 -0.082 -1.312 5,636
(-0.88) (0.67) (1.22) (-0.20) (-0.91) (-1.55) 0.007
Panel C: Dep. Var = Segment Pair Likely Reclassied
(11) All Pairs 0.755 0.945 -2.311 -0.015 0.179 -1.317 32,181
(0.20) (2.78) (-1.27) (-1.44) (3.40) (-1.47) 0.011
(12) Concen. + High Value -1.966 1.155 -3.873 -0.002 0.415 0.383 7,387
(-0.20) (1.98) (-1.81) (-0.16) (1.73) (0.11) 0.017
(13) Compet. + High Value -0.059 2.191 1.589 -0.008 0.141 -1.939 6,976
(-0.01) (1.58) (0.52) (-0.43) (1.04) (-1.63) 0.012
(14) Concen. + Low Value -15.880 0.860 -4.737 -0.009 -0.011 0.853 8,706
(-1.18) (1.54) (-1.44) (-0.30) (-0.05) (0.26) 0.011
(15) Compet. + Low Value 1.570 5.747 -4.486 -0.072 0.154 -0.346 5,636
(0.20) (1.95) (-1.50) (-1.99) (0.85) (-0.66) 0.013
Panel D: Dep. Var = Segment Pair Sold O
(16) All Pairs -2.326 0.186 -0.229 0.004 0.085 0.120 32,181
(-0.25) (0.54) (-0.07) (0.29) (0.31) (0.12) 0.004
(17) Concen. + High Value -27.734 -0.305 -8.540 0.021 0.655 2.888 7,387
(-1.61) (-0.73) (-1.18) (2.51) (1.26) (0.71) 0.009
(18) Compet. + High Value 11.600 0.115 1.604 0.010 -0.385 -2.983 6,976
(0.84) (0.04) (0.37) (0.33) (-0.97) (-0.80) 0.006
(19) Concen. + Low Value 2.023 -0.258 3.912 -0.009 0.046 0.726 8,706
(0.15) (-0.24) (0.77) (-0.26) (0.15) (0.21) 0.007
(20) Compet. + Low Value -0.911 10.004 -0.353 -0.552 0.147 0.945 5,636
(-0.04) (2.43) (-0.07) (-1.15) (0.39) (0.39) 0.004
42Table VII: Quality of Excess Valuation Calculations Across Methods
This table displays comparative summary statistics regarding conglomerate valuations and valuation accuracy across several dierent methods for computing conglomerate valuations.
All of the conglomerate valuation methods we consider are based on reconstructions of a conglomerate rm using the valuation ratios of existing pure play rms operating in the same
industries as each segment. A conglomerate's excess value is the natural logarithm of its rm value divided by the implied rm value using the pure play reconstruction. Panel B
discards an excess value calculation if it is outside the range f 1:386;+1:386g to reduce the aect of outliers (screen applied separately for each valuation method). Panel C discards
the observation if any one of the ve valuation methods generates a value outside this range (this holds the sample size xed). The Excess value column reports the average
sample-wide excess valuation using the valuation method reported in the rst column. The MSE Excess Value is the mean squared error of excess valuations using the given
valuation method (lower values indicate more accurate valuations). The observation counts column reports the number of conglomerates used to compute the average and MSE of
the excess values. We report these three columns using excess valuation metrics computed using sales to value ratios (rst three columns) and asset to value ratios (second three
columns). The nal column, Standard Deviation of Weights is computed for the text-based valuation methods, where the text is used to compute dierential weights for the pure
play rms used to compute excess values. For a detailed description of the valuation methods, please see Section IV. The rst method, Berger+Ofek Baseline is a replication of the
calculation used in Berger and Ofek (1995), where each segment is valued by computing the median rm value to sales ratio of pure play rms operating in the three digit SIC code of
each segment, and then multiplying this median by the segment's reported sales. Adding these implied segment valuations gives the overall conglomerate's implied value and is the key
benchmark compared to the actual conglomerate rm value used to compute excess valuation. The HP: SIC Universe: Whole Firm, Unconstrained uses text-based weights to
reconstruct the conglomerate. The median rm value to sales ratio is computed using a weighted median calculation, where the weights are given by the text decomposition regression
(conglomerate vocabulary is decomposed into the text of the available pure plays to construct a more precise product market replica). The HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Whole Firm,
Unconstrained method extends this method by expanding the set of available pure plays for the text decomposition regression to include pure plays residing in the same VIC-7.06
industry as the conglomerate. The HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Whole Firm, Constrained extends the method further using constrained regression, where the best-t
text-based reconstruction uses constrained regression methods to require that the reconstructed conglomerate matches the actual conglomerate on ve key characteristics: Sales
Growth, Log Age, OI/Sales, OI/Assets, and R&D/Sales. The HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained, Segment-by-Segment method is analogous, but also requires that the
pure plays allocated to each segment contribute to total sales of the reconstructed rm according to the actual sales ratios of the conglomerate.
Excess MSE Excess MSE














Panel A: Raw Data
1 Berger+Ofek Baseline (ss) -0.082 0.474 12714 -0.027 0.288 10916
2 HP: SIC Universe (wf): Unconstrained -0.058 0.463 12714 -0.038 0.268 12714 0.041
3 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Unconstrained -0.046 0.402 12733 -0.008 0.242 12733 0.031
4 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Constrained -0.012 0.320 12773 -0.001 0.208 12773 0.047
5 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (ss): Constrained, Segment-by-Segment -0.018 0.377 12675 0.020 0.282 10902 0.058
Panel B: Restrict to Excess Valuations to interval [-1.386,+1.386] (Berger and Ofek)
6 Berger+Ofek Baseline (ss) -0.069 0.334 11892 -0.066 0.212 8761
7 HP: SIC Universe (wf): Unconstrained -0.047 0.342 11912 -0.033 0.216 8805 0.041
8 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Unconstrained -0.038 0.314 12079 -0.014 0.194 8823 0.031
9 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Constrained -0.012 0.252 12213 -0.009 0.166 8844 0.047
10 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (ss): Constrained, Segment-by-Segment -0.012 0.281 12053 -0.017 0.191 8744 0.058
Panel C: Uniformly Restrict to interval [-1.386,+1.386]
11 Berger+Ofek Baseline (ss) -0.065 0.306 11152 -0.049 0.183 7716
12 HP: SIC Universe (wf): Unconstrained -0.040 0.308 11152 -0.018 0.190 7748 0.041
13 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Unconstrained -0.028 0.274 11152 -0.001 0.171 7766 0.030
14 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (wf): Constrained 0.004 0.210 11152 0.002 0.143 7778 0.045
15 HP: SIC+VIC Universe (ss): Constrained, Segment-by-Segment 0.000 0.244 11152 -0.003 0.169 7720 0.056
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3Table VIII: Characteristic Correlations (Conglomerate vs. Benchmark)
The table displays Pearson Correlation coecients between actual conglomerate characteristics and implied characteristics using several dierent conglomerate valuation methods. The
characteristic being analyzed is identied in the rst column, and the remaining columns present correlations using the valuation methods noted in the column headers. The last two
columns are based on constrained text regressions where the reconstructed conglomerate matches as closely as possible the actual conglomerate on ve key characteristics: Sales
Growth, Log Age, OI/Sales, OI/Assets, and R&D/Sales. These correlations are not 100% because the conglomerate reconstruction is based on a weighted median calculation.
Text-based
Berger Text-based Text-based Text-based SIC+VIC
+ Ofek SIC only SIC+VIC SIC+VIC Constrained
Row Variable (Baseline) No Constr. No Constr. Constrained (Seg by Seg)
Correlation Coecients
1 Assets 0.110 0.194 0.291 0.409 0.399
2 Sales 0.156 0.229 0.385 0.387 0.315
3 OI/Sales 0.375 0.425 0.479 0.850 0.675
4 OI/Assets 0.289 0.357 0.421 0.832 0.690
5 R&D/Sales 0.473 0.673 0.705 0.908 0.821
6 Tobin's Q 0.366 0.442 0.469 0.551 0.502
7 Sales Growth 0.241 0.270 0.309 0.825 0.683
8 VIC HHI 0.325 0.430 0.535 0.516 0.387
9 Log Age 0.268 0.298 0.436 0.924 0.731
4
4Table IX: Which Pure Plays Match with Conglomerates?
The table displays summary statistics for groups of pure play rms used with high versus low weights to reconstruct conglomerates (Panel A), and conglomerates with high and low
diculty to replicate using pure plays (Panel B). In Panel A, summary statistics are displayed for pure plays in the lowest quartile of tted weights, and for those in the highest
quartile. The table uses two text-based reconstructions: HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Whole Firm, Unconstrained, and HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Whole Firm,
Constrained. Table VII presents details on these text-based weight methods. Summary statistics are computed by rst sorting all pure play benchmarks for each conglomerate in
each year into quartiles based on each pure play's computed weight from the textual decomposition and then averaging the characteristic for all rms in the lowest and highest
quartiles, respectively. In Panel B, summary statistics are displayed for conglomerates with above and below median diculty to replicate using pure plays and within the four
subsamples as noted in the section headers. For both panels, t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the rm level test whether the means are dierent.
Panel A: Benchmark Portfolio Weights vs Characteristics
SIC+VIC Universe: Whole Firm, Un-constrained SIC+VIC Universe: Whole Firm, Constrained
Lowest Highest t-statistic Lowest Highest t-statistic
Weights Weights of Weights Weights of
Row Variable Quartile Quartile Dierence Quartile Quartile Dierence
1 Assets 3466.56 4723.34 6.52 3564.72 4934.27 6.85
2 Sales 1563.12 2147.15 9.49 1580.38 2213.75 10.53
3 oi/sales 0.07 0.08 6.59 0.07 0.08 8.00
4 oi/assets 0.07 0.07 0.55 0.07 0.07 1.20
5 R+D/sales 0.11 0.09 -14.15 0.11 0.09 -14.20
6 Tobin's Q 2.05 1.92 -4.84 2.04 1.88 -6.50
7 Sales Growth 0.17 0.16 -9.10 0.18 0.16 -17.92
8 VIC-7.06 HHI 0.08 0.07 -12.58 0.08 0.07 -9.48
9 Firm Age 25.32 29.19 18.63 24.06 30.32 29.14
Panel B: Diculty of Pure Plays to Replicate vs Characteristics
Lowest Highest t-statistic Lowest Highest t-statistic
Diculty Diculty of Diculty Diculty of
Row Variable to Replicate to Replicate Dierence to Replicate to Replicate Dierence
Conglomerates with Concentrated Industries Between Conglomerates with Competitive Industries Between
10 Fraction of Ind. Between 0.142 0.224 5.951 0.046 0.054 1.940
11 Across Ind. Similarity 0.023 0.019 -7.193 0.041 0.032 -7.913
12 Within Ind. Similarity 0.063 0.047 -8.153 0.091 0.063 -12.133
13 VIC HHI 0.053 0.082 10.054 0.029 0.059 17.454
Conglomerates with High Value Industries Between Conglomerates with Low Value Industries Between
14 Fraction of Ind. Between 0.079 0.203 10.213 0.071 0.131 6.561
15 Across Ind. Similarity 0.035 0.023 -11.465 0.034 0.024 -9.119
16 Within Ind. Similarity 0.084 0.058 -11.289 0.073 0.050 -10.204
17 VIC HHI 0.032 0.068 15.182 0.047 0.075 11.201
4
5Table X: Conglomerate Excess Valuations
This table presents OLS regression estimates of conglomerate excess value on text-based variables. One observation is one conglomerate from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable is
the conglomerate's excess valuation using the best text-based reconstruction (Panel A) or using the Berger and Ofek reconstruction (Panel B) as the dependent variable. The best
text-based reconstruction is the \HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained" model as illustrated in Table VII. The independent variables include ve text based variables, and four control
variables used in the literature (R&D/Sales, CAPX/Sales, OI/Sales, and Log Assets). All variables are winsorized at the 1%/99% level . The Diculty of Pure Plays to Replicate
variable is one minus the R2 from the text decomposition regressions used to rebuild each conglomerate. The Fraction of Industries Between Pair is the fraction of all other SIC-3
industries residing in the product market space \between" the two industries comprising the pair. Across Segment Similarity is the average textual similarity of pure play rms
operating in the same three digit SIC segments as the conglomerate. Within Segment Similarity is the average similarity of pure play rms operating within the industries
occupied by the given conglomerate. Conglomerate Average Concentration is the weighted average VIC-7.06 HHI of all rms used to reconstruct the given conglomerate. Log
Document Length is a control variable equal to the natural logarithm of the number of words in the given conglomerate's product description. Year xed eects are included in each
regression. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering by rm.
Diculty Fraction Conglom.
of Pure of Across Within Average Log Vertical
Plays to Indust. Segment Segment Concen- Document Relat- R&D/ CAPX/ OI/ Log # Obs. /
Row Replicate Between Similarity Similarity tration Length edness Sales Sales Sales Assets RSQ
Panel A: Excess Value (Text-based Constrained Valuation Model)
(1) 0.389 0.060 0.156 -0.229 0.009 -0.023 -0.286 1.263 0.473 0.604 0.045 9,201
(7.04) (0.87) (0.28) (-0.80) (0.04) (-1.14) (-1.18) (6.11) (7.09) (8.59) (9.14) 0.101
(2) 0.406 . . -0.026 -0.338 1.287 0.467 0.603 0.044 9,201
(7.59) (-1.35) (-1.44) (6.42) (7.08) (8.58) (9.07) 0.100
(3) 0.120 . -0.075 -0.282 1.212 0.453 0.600 0.039 9,201
(1.92) (-3.97) (-1.19) (5.97) (6.97) (8.50) (7.95) 0.088
(4) . -0.888 . -0.073 -0.259 1.147 0.453 0.594 0.040 9,201
(-1.98) (-3.88) (-1.08) (5.53) (6.98) (8.41) (8.07) 0.088
(5) . -0.616 -0.068 -0.309 1.102 0.459 0.600 0.040 9,201
(-2.48) (-3.58) (-1.31) (5.29) (6.99) (8.48) (8.20) 0.089
(6) . . 0.508 -0.067 -0.355 1.144 0.463 0.597 0.040 9,201
(2.06) (-3.48) (-1.51) (5.58) (7.03) (8.47) (8.17) 0.088
Panel B: Excess Value (Berger + Ofek Valuation Model)
(7) 0.542 -0.007 0.045 -0.720 -0.473 0.057 0.054 2.392 0.688 1.118 0.063 8,951
(7.96) (-0.08) (0.07) (-2.19) (-1.52) (2.33) (0.18) (9.96) (7.57) (12.43) (10.78) 0.199
(8) 0.549 . . 0.056 0.003 2.454 0.688 1.113 0.063 8,951
(8.23) (2.41) (0.01) (10.55) (7.58) (12.36) (10.84) 0.198
(9) 0.099 . -0.012 0.022 2.314 0.659 1.105 0.055 8,951
(1.31) (-0.54) (0.08) (9.77) (7.32) (12.18) (9.49) 0.179
(10) . -1.273 . -0.007 0.116 2.222 0.664 1.096 0.056 8,951
(-2.37) (-0.29) (0.39) (9.26) (7.38) (12.11) (9.68) 0.180
(11) . -1.130 0.005 0.077 2.122 0.681 1.106 0.058 8,951
(-3.94) (0.21) (0.26) (8.85) (7.55) (12.25) (9.88) 0.182
(12) . . 0.348 -0.008 -0.041 2.264 0.665 1.102 0.056 8,951
(1.10) (-0.33) (-0.14) (9.53) (7.36) (12.18) (9.52) 0.179
4
6Table XI: Economic Magnitudes and Excess Valuation
This table displays average excess valuation statistics for quintiles based on the diculty of pure plays to replicate variable. The Diculty of Pure Plays to Replicate is one minus
the R2 from the text decomposition regressions used to rebuild each conglomerate. For each quintile, we report the average diculty variable, and average raw excess valuations based
on both the text-based and Berger and Ofek methods in the rst three columns. The best text-based reconstruction is the \HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained" model as illustrated
in Table VII. The residual excess valuations are residuals from a regression of excess valuation on all of the variables included in Table X excluding the Diculty to Replicate variable.
These residual excess valuations thus reect the conditional impact of the diculty to replicate on the excess valuation.
Raw Raw Residual Residual
Diculty to Excess Excess Excess Excess
Replicate Diculty to Valuation Valuation Valuation Valuation
Quintile Replicate (text-based) (Berger+Ofek) (text-based) (Berger+Ofek) Obs.
Summary Statistics by Quintile
Lowest Diculty 0.630 -0.045 -0.035 -0.059 -0.058 2,331
Quintile 2 0.729 -0.003 -0.043 0.002 -0.009 2,339
Quintile 3 0.795 -0.007 -0.093 -0.000 -0.027 2,337
Quintile 4 0.858 -0.004 -0.094 0.015 -0.008 2,339
Highest Diculty 1.028 0.047 -0.029 0.085 0.107 2,333
4
7Table XII: Conglomerate Excess Valuations (Various Subsamples)
The table presents OLS regression estimates of conglomerate excess value on our text based variables. One observation is one conglomerate from 1997 to 2008. We consider various
subsamples as noted in the panel headers. The dependent variable is the conglomerate's excess valuation using the \HP: SIC+VIC Universe: Constrained" model as illustrated in
Table VII. The independent variables include ve text based variables, and four control variables used in the literature (R&D/Sales, CAPX/Sales, OI/Sales, and Log Assets). All
variables are winsorized at the 1%/99% level . The Diculty of Pure Plays to Replicate variable is one minus the R2 from the text decomposition regressions used to rebuild each
conglomerate. The Fraction of Industries Between Pair is the fraction of all other SIC-3 industries residing in the product market space \between" the two industries comprising
the pair. Across Segment Similarity is the average textual similarity of pure play rms operating in the same three digit SIC segments as the conglomerate. Within Segment
Similarity is the average similarity of pure play rms operating within the industries occupied by the given conglomerate. Conglomerate Average Concentration is the weighted
average VIC-7.06 HHI of all rms used to reconstruct the given conglomerate. Log Document Length is a control variable equal to the natural logarithm of the number of words in
the given conglomerate's product description. All regressions contain time xed eects. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering by rm.
Diculty Fraction Conglom.
of Pure of Across Within Average Log Vertical
Plays to Indust. Segment Segment Concen- Document Relat- R&D/ CAPX/ OI/ Log # Obs. /
Row Replicate Between Similarity Similarity tration Length edness Sales Sales Sales Assets RSQ
Panel A: Excess Value (Conglomerates with High Value Industries Between)
(7) 0.473 0.098 -0.084 -0.396 -0.120 -0.015 0.238 1.426 0.507 0.567 0.047 4,178
(5.08) (1.13) (-0.09) (-0.96) (-0.32) (-0.55) (0.68) (4.70) (6.61) (6.44) (7.12) 0.111
(8) 0.183 . -0.075 0.200 1.391 0.486 0.561 0.041 4,178
(2.34) (-2.97) (0.60) (4.70) (6.49) (6.39) (6.20) 0.097
Panel B: Excess Value (Conglomerates with Low Value Industries Between)
(9) 0.323 -0.107 -1.726 -0.089 -0.214 -0.036 -0.544 0.784 0.455 0.640 0.043 4,172
(5.11) (-1.10) (-1.83) (-0.23) (-0.74) (-1.40) (-1.73) (2.61) (3.79) (5.20) (6.79) 0.092
(10) 0.062 . -0.073 -0.520 0.806 0.455 0.664 0.036 4,172
(0.74) (-2.96) (-1.67) (2.70) (3.86) (5.36) (5.80) 0.079
4
8